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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
AND SECURITY AND RECONSTRUCTION†

Muna Ndulo∗

I. INTRODUCTION

Several studies show that despite recent increases in the number of minor
conflicts, long-term trends suggest that international and civil wars are declining1.
Analyzing the causes of the improvement in global security since 1990, the 2006 Human
Security Report argues that the United Nations played a critically important role in
spearheading a huge upsurge of international conflict prevention, peacekeeping and
peacebuilding activities.2

The evidence that these initiatives worked is not just

circumstantial. Contrary to popular perceptions, a recent RAND Corporation study, for
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1
Human Security Brief 2006, Human Security Report Centre (2006), available at
http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/2006/overview.aspx. See also Human Security Report
2009/2010: The Causes of Peace and the Shrinking Costs of War (2010), Human Security Report Project,
available at http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/20092010/text.aspx.
2
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, The Challenges of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War, in HOW
TO SPEND $50 BILLION TO MAKE THE WORLD A BETTER PLACE 39, 51 (Bjørn Lomborg ed., 2006). See also
Human Security Brief 2006, supra note 1, at ch. 3. The 2009/2010 Human Security Report makes the same
point and states that, while not suggesting that it is the sole explanation, peacemaking and peacebuilding
makes a difference. Human Security Report 2009/2010, supra note 1, at pt. I.
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example, found that two-thirds of the UN’s peacebuilding missions had succeeded.3 In
addition, the sharp increase in peacemaking efforts led to a significant increase in the
number of conflicts ending in negotiated settlements.4 The annual cost of the charges to
the international community has been modest — well under 1% of world military
spending.5 The US Government Accountability Office estimated that it would cost the
United States approximately twice as much as the United Nations to conduct a
peacekeeping operation similar to the UN stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH):
an estimated $876 million compared to the UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14
months of the mission.6

In fact, in 2006, the cost of running all of the UN’s 19

peacekeeping operations around the world for an entire year was less than the United
States spent in Iraq at the height of the Iraq war in a single month.7 Despite the positive
changes, the RAND Corporation study makes it clear that there are no grounds for
complacency.8
Although the number of wars has decreased, far too many remain — and there are
still several places of instability around the globe that could easily turn into conflict areas.

3

JAMES DOBBINS, A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 6 (2007) (including
testimony presented before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee. on International
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight on June 13, 2007).
4
Id. at 7.
5
See Financing Peacekeeping, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml; and UN
Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/backgroundnote.pdf. The
approved peacekeeping budget for the period from July 2010 to June 2011 is approximately U.S. $7.3
billion. This represents about 0.5 percent of global military spending, estimated at U.S. $1.531 trillion. Id.
6
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-331, PEACEKEEPING: COST COMPARISON OF ACTUAL UN
AND HYPOTHETICAL US OPERATIONS IN HAITI 7 (2006).
7
Dobbins points out that the UN is a comparatively efficient and cost effective force provider. In its
specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil as well as military capabilities needed for nation
building. DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 2. All missions UN missions are planned, controlled, and sustained by
a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN headquarters in New York. Id. Most troops come from
Third World countries whose costs per deployed soldier are a small fraction of any western army. Id. See
also Richard Wolf, Afghan War Costs Now Outpace Iraq’s, USA TODAY, May 13, 2010,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-05-12-afghan_N.htm.
8
DOBBINS, supra note 3, at 8.
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Furthermore, because the underlying causes of conflicts are too rarely addressed, the risks
of new conflicts breaking out in the same area and old ones starting up again remain very
real. This happened in Haiti where the UN is in its second peacekeeping mission to the
country.9 In terms of the challenge to establish enduring peace in conflict zones, the
Security Council has emphasized that “the biggest deterrent to violent conflict is
addressing the root causes of conflict, including through the promotion of sustainable
development and a democratic society based on a strong rule of law and civic institutions,
including adherence to all human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural.”10
One of the determinants of success, therefore, of any peacekeeping mission is the extent
to which it has the capacity to address the root causes of a conflict in the host state of the
mission. In August 2000, a famous UN report, the Brahimi Report, acknowledged the
shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping efforts and recommended wide-ranging reforms
aimed at strengthening the operations and making them more effective.11 Since then
there have been numerous other reports aimed at implementing reforms to strengthen
United Nations peacekeeping operations.12
This article builds on that report and discusses the broad challenges facing United
Nations peacekeeping missions today and the role of the United Nations peacekeeping
operations in the resolution of conflicts and in the reconstruction of post conflicts states.
The objective of the article is to identify areas that need attention to make peacekeeping
9

Ian Martin, Paper versus Steel: The First Phase of the International Civilian Mission in Haiti, in
HONORING HUMAN RIGHTS AND KEEPING THE PEACE: LESSONS FROM EL SALVADOR, CAMBODIA, AND
HAITI 83 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 1995).
10
S.C. Res. 1327, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1327 (Nov. 13, 2000).
11
Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, Rep., transmitted by identical letters dated Aug. 21, 2000 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000). The report is called the Brahimi Report after its
chairman of the committee which produced the report.
12
E.g. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/59/608 (Dec. 15, 2004).
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missions more effective. The article is broken down into the following sections: (II)
peacekeeping in theory and practice; (III) the peacekeeping mandate; (IV) conditions and
factors that can help determine the success or failure of a peacekeeping mission; and (IV)
the broad challenges that face peacekeeping missions.

II. PEACEKEEPING: BACKGROUND, THEORY, AND PRACTICE

The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order to “save
succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”13 Meeting this challenge is the most
important yardstick by which the organization is judged by the people it exists to serve.
One of the most important ways in which the UN intervenes in conflicts and promotes
peace is through peacekeeping operations.

Given the centrality of peacekeeping to

United Nations peace initiatives, it is somewhat surprising that no precise definition of
peacekeeping can be found in the United Nations Charter.14 It would appear, therefore,
that the “technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United Nations.”15
In all likelihood, this is the result of the fact that the Charter’s authors “envisaged that
threats to international peace and security would primarily consist of aggression by one
state against another. . . . Peacekeeping was not envisaged as part of the organization’s
role, which lay primarily in establishing a system of collective security.”16 Peacekeeping
missions do not seem to fit within the scope of the activities specified by chapter VI of

13

U.N. Charter preamble.
FREDERIC L. KIRGIS, JR., INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THEIR LEGAL SETTING 717 (2d ed. 1993).
15
Brian Urquhart, The United Nations, Collective Security and International Peacekeeping, in
NEGOTIATING WORLD ORDER: THE ARTISANSHIP AND ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY 59, 62 (Alan
K. Henrikson ed., Scholarly Res. 1986).
16
ALEX J. BELLAMY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING 46 (2004).
14
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the Charter, which concerns the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes,” or chapter VII of the
Charter, which addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace and Acts of Aggression.”17

As a practical matter, when establishing a

peacekeeping mission, the Security Council has usually invoked chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter.18

Peacekeeping missions are distinct from enforcement actions

undertaken by the United Nations under chapter VII of the Charter, as “[e]nforcement
action is directed against a state or other political entity, and has a coercive design. U.N.
peacekeeping, on the other hand, is not directed ‘against’ a particular wrongdoer and
traditionally has involved coercion only in a minimal sense, if at all.”19 The Charter
contains a tension between the doctrines of national sovereignty and the protection and
promotion of individual rights and the promotion of peace and security generally in the
context of a civil war.20 Although the preamble of the Charter contains an affirmation to
“reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,”21 article 2(7) states that “nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”22
Peacekeeping operations have been a major activity of the United Nations almost
since its establishment in 1945. The United Nations has been involved in over 63

17

See U.N. Charter, art. 33-51.
BRUCE R. PIRNIE & WILLIAM E. SIMONS, SOLDIERS FOR PEACE: CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES xi
(1996).
19
KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 716.
20
The Charter in Chapter I, Article 2(7) guarantees sovereignty by providing that “[n]othing contained in
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 2, para 7. But in Article 13, the United Nations undertakes to
promote human rights. Id. at art. 13, para 1.
21
Id. at preamble.
22
Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
18
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peacekeeping missions since 1948.23 As the practice has evolved over the years, a
peacekeeping operation has come to be defined as an operation involving military
personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by the United Nations to help
maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.24

These

operations are voluntary and based on consent and cooperation. While they involve the
use of military personnel, the peacekeeping missions achieve their objectives not by force
of arms, thus contrasting them with the enforcement action of the United Nations under
article 42 of the Charter.25 United Nations peacekeeping missions typically also involve
a large number of civilians and civilian police.26 United Nations peacekeeping is a
unique and dynamic mechanism developed by the United Nations and is means to help
countries torn by conflict create the conditions for lasting peace.27
The first United Nations peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the
Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East
to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.28 Over the
years, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a

23

United Nations Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.
24
A former UN Legal Counsel has defined peacekeeping operations as actions involving the use of military
personnel in international conflicts situations on the basis of the consent of all parties concerned and
without resorting to armed force except in cases of self defense. E. Suy, Peace-Keeping Operations, in A
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (R.J. Dupuy ed., 1988).
25
Article 42 of the United Nations Charter provides for the Security Council to take enforcement measures
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United
Nations. U.N. Charter art. 42.
26
U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operation: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/62/627 (Dec. 28, 2007).
27
Dag Hammarskjld referred to peacekeeping as belonging to “Chapter VI and a half,” which puts it
between traditional methods of peaceful dispute resolution such as negotiation and mediation under
Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII. 60 Years United Nations
Peacekeeping, United Nations Information Service,
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/60years_peacekeeping.pdf.
28
KIRGIS, supra note 14, at 720.
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changing political landscape. During the Cold War, when cold war rivalries frequently
paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to
maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be
made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.29 They operated
under UN command and were primarily mandated with the implementation of activities
agreed upon by warring factions, such as the cantonment and separation of belligerents,
the monitoring of borders, and the verification of the ceasefire.30 With the end of the
Cold War, the strategic context for UN peacekeeping dramatically changed, prompting
the UN organization to shift and expand its field operations from “traditional missions”
involving strictly military tasks to complex “multidimensional” enterprises designed to
ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the
foundation for sustainable peace.31
The transformation of peacekeeping missions reflects in the UN’s own words
more than hybridization: “The goals of Peacekeeping Missions have in fact changed
significantly: from assisting in the maintenance of ceasefires during cold war
peacekeeping operations during the 1990s increasingly becoming peacebuilding
missions.”32

The broad and complex mandates of today’s multidimensional peace

29

60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, http://un.org/en/peacekeeping/
operations/surge.shtml.
30
See generally Larry M. Forster, Training Standards for United Nations Military Observers: The
Foundation of Excellence, 6 AFR. SECURITY REV. 4 (1997). Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills observe, “Until
the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was largely a matter of upholding a peace already agreed to. After
the fall of the Berlin Wall peacekeeping became more ambitious as the international community sought to
rebuild failed states and grapple with complex emergencies.” See Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills, From
Peacekeeping to Managing Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa, in FROM
PEACEKEEPING TO COMPLEX EMERGENCIES: PEACE SUPPORT MISSIONS IN AFRICA 2-3 (Jakkie Cilliers &
Greg Mills eds., 1999).
31
60 Years of UN Peacekeeping, supra note 27; A History of Peacekeeping, supra note 29.
32
U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacebuilding: Lessons from Recent
Experience, (Apr. 1999). In those days the UN were defenders of the status quo, and operated with light
arms under the strict instruction to use force only in self-defense.
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operations reflect the varied civilian, military, and police capabilities required to provide
support to the challenges of modern day peacekeeping. These include tasks such as
promoting political transitions, assisting in the development of political structures,
demobilization of armed forces, the provision of humanitarian relief during emergencies
to refugees and internally displaced people, establishing the rule of law, promoting
security, supporting disarmament, holding elections, and jump-starting the economy.33
As an example, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique involved peacekeeping, the
demobilization of armed forces, provision of humanitarian aid, democratization,
demining, the return of Mozambican refugees that had fled to neighboring countries, and
electoral support which culminated in the 1994 general election which ushered in a post
conflict government.34 Other missions — including the UN Transition Assistance Group
(UNTAG) in Namibia, the UN Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) in South
Africa, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the UN Observer
Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) — had huge electoral mandates that included
organizing elections and monitoring the electoral process.35 Indicative of the change in
33

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 26, at ¶ 19. See also Peter H. Gantz, The Postconflict Security Gap
and the United Nations Peace Operations System, in SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND RECONCILIATION:
WHEN THE WARS END 247(Muna Ndulo ed., 2007). In Mozambique “the United Nations established a
trust fund to help RENAMO transform itself from a military movement into a political party.” UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995 4
(1995). The UN argues that the “transformation of a guerrilla force, experienced only in war, into a
political entity with a stake in the democratic process, is one of the most significant legacies of the United
Nations operation” in Mozambique. Id.
34
THE UNITED NATIONS AND MOZAMBIQUE 1992-1995, supra note 33.
35
Jeff Fischer, Elections and International Civilian Policing: History and Practice in Peace Operations,
INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR ELECTION SERVICES WHITE PAPERS (June 18, 2002). ONUMOZ was
established by Security Council resolution 799 in December 1992 to help implement the general peace
agreement signed on October 4, 1992 by the president of Mozambique and the president of the Resistancia
Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO). UNTAG was established in accordance with resolution 632 of
February 1989 to assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to ensure the early
independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the UN.
ONUSAL was established on May 20, 1991 by Security Council resolution 1991. Its mandate was to
verify the implementation of all agreements between the government of El Salvador and Frente Farbundo
Marti para la Liberacion Nacional aimed at ending a decade long civil war. UNTAC was established by
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strategy was a 1999 UN report which recommended that “mandates should be
conceptualized flexibly and could include elements of peacebuilding and emergency
reconstruction of war torn economies.”36
In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council launched an unprecedented number
of peacekeeping operations.37 By the mid-nineties, political and financial support for
peacekeeping operations had waned, especially from the United States after the failure of
the United States-led (and UN-sanctioned) mission in Somalia in 1992 and 1993.38
Support from troop-contributing countries shriveled as the UN fell behind in its payments
and military challenges in civil war situations mounted.39
Despite the supposed broad array of conflict management techniques,
international attention remains fixed on “peacekeeping” or the utility of multinational
interventions as an essential element in the amelioration or resolution of armed conflict.
The frustrating aspect of the approach is that even as the perceived demand for
peacekeeping has increased, the capacity of the UN to deliver peacekeepers seems to
have diminished.40 This is largely because of the huge cost implications of peacekeeping
operations. The two UN missions in Southern Sudan and Darfur faced many difficulties
Security Council resolution 745 of February 28, 1992 to ensure the implementation of the Agreement of a
Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict signed in Paris on October 23, 1991.
UNOMSA was established by Security Council resolution 772 in 1992 and 1994 to assist the people of
South Africa in their transition from apartheid South Africa to a non-racial democratic society. Id.
36
Rep. of the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent
Experience, (1999).
37
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 620 (David M. Malone ed.,
2004). Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills observed that “the early 1990s were the high water mark in the
euphoria of the post-cold war era of peacekeeping. While 13 operations were established in the first 40
years of UN peacekeeping, 36 new operations have been launched since 1988.” Cilliers and Mills, supra
note 30, at 1.
38
ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, BUILDING PEACE IN WEST AFRICA: LIBERIA, SIERRA LEONE AND GUINEA-BISSAU 16
(2002).
39
DOBBINS , supra note 3, at 3.
40
Rep. of the Special Comm. On Peacekeeping Operations, General Assembly, Comprehensive Review of
the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, ¶¶ 7-8 U.N. Doc. A/54/839 (Mar.
20, 2000).
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in deployment, coordination, and making the missions operational.41 The United Nations
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was set up by the United Nations Security Council in March
2005.42

Its mandate was to support the implementation of the Southern Sudan

Comprehensive Peace Agreement.43

The African Union-United Nations Mission in

Darfur (UNAMID), an AU/UN hybrid operation and one of the largest UN missions ever,
was established by the Security Council in July 2007 to bolster the African Union (AU)
mission in Darfur which had been operating there since 2004.44 Its mission is to oversee
the implementation of Darfur peace agreements and to protect civilians.45 The first
mission deployed in Sudan under the leadership of the AU faced enormous challenges
with equipment, which negatively impacted their effectiveness.

Soon after the AU

deployed forces, rebels drove into an AU base in eastern Darfur, stole technical
equipment and weapons, and killed ten Nigerian peacekeepers.46 Poorly equipped and
outfitted, the AU soldiers did not have a chance. They could not defend themselves
adequately nor could they hunt their attackers; the peacekeepers did not have helicopters
to do that. The deployment situation has since improved, as the mission was transformed
into a UN/AU hybrid mission but peacekeeping efforts have been limited as the mission

41

Centre for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional and Extra-Regional
Challenges 3 (2010).
42
S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005).
43
The 10,000 strong UN mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) which was launched to support the implementation
of the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan
and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army faced many
challenges. DANIEL LARGE & CHRIS SAUNDERS, STABILIZING SUDAN: DOMESTIC, SUB-REGIONAL, AND
EXTRA-REGIONAL CHALLENGES 7 (2010).
44
S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
45
On July 31, 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1769 authorizing the
deployment of a 26,000 strong United Nations-African Union force to help implement peace agreements.
S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). In Part 15(a)(ii), the resolution invoked Chapter 7
to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect civilians. Id. at ¶ 15.
46
Alexander Schwabe, Failure Looms for Darfur Peacekeepers, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Nov. 23, 2007, http://
www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,5193330,00.html.
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lacks a peace agreement to implement.47 The mission remains a peacekeeping mission in
the midst of ongoing conflict. The demands of United Nations peacekeeping will always
test the will of the international community to promote peace and security in the world’s
conflict areas. Despite widespread recognition that, in order to be effective, United
Nations peacekeeping needs the concrete contributions of the member states in the form
of personnel, finances, and political support, the international community invariably fails
to meet the needs of peacekeeping operations.48
As the UN peacekeeping enterprise declined after the Somalia failure, the United
States started to promote “regional” approaches to peacekeeping, particularly through
NATO.49 The Clinton administration deployed U.S. military personnel to Kosovo, first
as part of a NATO air operation to force the withdrawal of Yugoslavia troops from
Kosovo, and next as part of a NATO peacekeeping force.50 But after the war in Kosovo
in spring of 1999, broad opposition to unilateral peacekeeping led to a revival of the UN
variety of peacekeeping.51 Major new UN peacekeeping operation (PKO) missions in
East Timor,52 Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and the Congo brought another surge in

47

Center for Conflict Resolution, Stabilizing Sudan: Domestic, Sub-Regional, and Extra-Regional
Challenges 8 (2010).
48
Schwabe, supra note 46.
49
Sarah B. Sewall, U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations, Carr Center for
Human Rights Policy Working Paper 01-3 (2000)..
50
In the Balkans, the intervention in Kosovo was a NATO mission.
51
Richard Falk, Legality to Legitimacy: the Revival of the Just War Framework, HARV. INT’L REV., May 6,
2006, http://hir.harvard.edu/interventionism/legality-to-legitimacy.
52
The United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11, 1999 and ended on
October 25, 1999. East Timor – UNMISET – Background,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmiset/ background.html. A second mission, United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), was established to administer the territory.
Id. At independence UNTAET was succeeded by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET),
established by Security Council resolution 1410 of May 17, 2002 to provide assistance to core
administrative structures critical to the validity and political stability in East Timor. S.C. Res. 1410, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1410 (May 17, 2002).
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international peacekeeping.53

Today there are almost 124,000 personnel serving

hundreds of millions of people around the world.54 There are a total of 16 peacekeeping
missions in place, including seven in Africa, one in the Americas, two in Asia, three in
Europe, and three in the Middle East.

This represents a nine-fold increase in UN

peacekeeping since 1999.55
There can be no dispute that United Nations peacekeeping missions have had
mixed results. There have been successes and failures. Mozambique, Cambodia, and
East Timor are examples of successful transitions from conflict to stable states. A
troubling aspect is that there have been cases where second missions have been
necessary, such as in Liberia and Haiti.56 It is important, therefore, to examine the
problems faced by peacekeeping missions and consider how best to organize them to
effectively promote peace and development to troubled parts of the world.
Given the potentially unlimited scope of activities that can be encompassed by the
term “peacekeeping mission,” it is useful to examine the categories of missions
periodically undertaken by the United Nations. There are two policy documents that
define the nature of peacekeeping operations: An Agenda for Peace57 and the Brahimi

53

Both Liberia and Haiti have had repeat missions. See Charles Arthur, Building Peace in Haiti, 4 U.N.
Chronicle 69 (2000-2001); ADEBAJO, supra note 38, at 43.
54
UN Peacekeeping Background Note, http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2010/factsheet.pdf.
55
Id.
56
U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and PeaceKeeping: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) (hereinafter An
Agenda for Peace). After the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) brokered a
peace agreement in 1993, the Security Council established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
(UNOMIL) by resolution 866 in 1993. The mission was completed in 1997. The war resumed. After a
peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council
resolution 1509 in 2003. The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established by resolution 867
in 1993. The crisis resumed in 2004 and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was
established by resolution 1542 in 2004. Id.
57
Id.
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Report.58 Peacekeeping has evolved rapidly in the past decade from the traditional,
primarily military model of observing ceasefires and forcing separation after interstate
wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian working
together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of civil wars. Boutouros-Boutorous
Ghali, in his An Agenda for Peace, outlines five types of missions: (a) preventive
diplomacy; (b) peace making; (c) peacekeeping; (d) peace enforcement; and (e)
peacebuilding.59
A. Preventive Diplomacy
Through preventive diplomacy, the UN seeks to remove the sources of danger
before violence erupts. This means taking actions that are aimed at easing tensions
before they result in conflict. It also means early warning of impending conflicts based
on information gathering and fact finding. It is clear that early warning systems are not
working as effectively as they should; otherwise, such tragic situations as Darfur could
have been foreseen (and prevented).

Rather, it seems that civil society (non-

governmental organizations and the media) often do a better job than the UN system.
Indeed, it was the NGO Human Rights Watch that first warned the world about Darfur.60
To effectively provide early warning, the UN would need (improved?) capacity in both
information gathering and analysis of information.

58

Rep. of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations, U.N. Doc. A/55/305, S/2000/809 (2000). This report is
commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report after its chairman Lakhdar Brahimi. The report was published
in response to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s request that the panel review UN peacekeeping
operations and make recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in
the future. It is regarded as one of the key documents on peacekeeping in the UN.
59
See An Agenda for Peace, supra note 56.
60
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 16 DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA
FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 6(A) (May 6, 2004). The report is an extensive and detailed documentation of
the killing of thousands of people by the Government and militias allied to it. The report accused the
Sudanese Government of being responsible for ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
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However, it bears noting that, even when information has been available,
responses to outbreaks of conflict have been slow, often hobbled by conflicting foreign
policy interests of Security Council members and the reluctance of states to incur the
human, material, and financial cost of United Nations intervention.61 Perhaps the clearest
and most cited example of this is the failure to act in Rwanda. It is well known that the
UN Force Commander in Rwanda, General Dallaire, on January 11, 1994, wrote to thenSecretary-General Kofi Annan informing him of information received indicating that
Hutu extremists were preparing to exterminate Tutsis and that major arms caches could
be identified by the informant. General Daillaire stated that his forces were prepared to
act. Annan’s response was that Dallaire was not to confront the extremist, as that was not
within his mandate.62 Thus, capacity to provide early warning may be rendered moot if
not met with the willingness to act upon such information — and prevent or at least
mitigate the warned-about crises.
B. Peace Making
Peace making falls between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping
the peace; it involves efforts to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means.
Peace making addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using
the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of governments,
groups of states, regional organizations, or the United Nations; peacemakers may
likewise be unofficial and non-governmental groups, as was the case in Mozambique,
where negotiations leading to a peace accord were led by a team of four non-UN
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personnel.63 Peace making may even be the work of a prominent personality, working
independent of or with the UN, such as George Mitchell, Jr.’s work in Northern Ireland
or Kofi Annan’s work in Kenya. More specifically, as a U.S. Special Envoy to Northern
Ireland, George Mitchell, Jr. chaired all party negotiations leading to the Good Friday
Agreement in 1998.64 For his part, Kofi Annan chaired the Panel of Eminent African
Personalities, which led the peace process following Kenya’s post-election violence in
2007,65 bringing about a peace agreement after the country was at the brink of collapse.66
C. Peacekeeping
At another level, peacekeeping is when conflict has broken out and the UN
intervenes in order to assist in keeping peace; such initiatives aim to create space for the
parties to negotiate a settlement. Examples include peacekeeping missions in South
Africa, Haiti, Liberia, Balkans, and East Timor.67

Typically, the UN deploys a large

force to keep the parties apart and enforce whatever peace accords to which the parties
agree. In most cases, in the interest of speed, the United Nations allows an international
force or a country to act on its behalf before it deploys. For example, in East Timor and
Haiti, the United Nations allowed the Australian government and the United States
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government, respectively, to deploy troops before the UN deployed.68 Such an approach
is more time efficient, given that the United Nations does not have a standing army, and it
therefore always takes a while before it can assemble and deploy a peacekeeping force.
Notably, the speed at which deployment proceeds depends entirely on troop contributions
from member states and the timely availability of resources to finance the mission.69
D. Peace Enforcement
This constitutes a type of military activity that, while coercive in nature, remains
distinct from war. The concept of peace enforcement rests on the premise that force is
being used to enforce a mandate. An example would be the use of force in Sierra Leone
to make the rebels abide by the peace agreements they had signed. It is also found in
country doctrines. According to the UK military doctrine, peace enforcement initiatives
are neither in support of nor against a particular party, but are designed to restore peace
and ensure compliance with the mandate in an evenhanded manner.70 The problem with
peace enforcement is always going to be how to ensure that the use of force will not
influence the political dynamics of the conflict. The side against whom the enforcement
is being carried out is likely to view the United Nations peacekeepers as enemies.
Accordingly, a UN report encourages caution in the use of the peace enforcement option,
warning that it “was impossible to stop a war by spreading it.”71 The solution is to expect
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the Force Commander to excise good judgment as to when an enforcement measure
would be appropriate.

E. Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding is a term of more recent origin that defines activities undertaken on
the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for
building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.72 This
occurs after both a ceasefire and a political settlement have been reached. In other words,
in these cases, the parties have already agreed upon their solution to the conflict. These
types of operations incorporate a substantial number of civilians alongside the military
component. Thus peacebuilding is not limited to demobilizing and reintegrating former
combatants into civilian society; peacebuilding also includes building institutions of
governance, building a civil service and the judiciary, and strengthening the rule of law
(for example, through training and restructuring of local police and judicial and penal
reform). Peacebuilding further includes improving respect for human rights through the
monitoring of, education on, and investigation of past and existing abuses and providing
technical assistance for democratic transition (including electoral assistance and support
for the development of free media and civil society, as well as promoting conflict
resolution and reconciliation techniques). In Somalia, the Security Council, in March
1993, envisaged a role for UNOSOM II that involved far more than simply the
continuation of the first mission which was charged with securing an environment for
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humanitarian assistance.73 Indeed, Boutros Ghali called for a mandate that “would also
empower UNOSOM II to provide assistance to the Somali people in rebuilding their
shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing, and recreating a Somali
state based on democratic governance and rehabilitating the country’s economy and
infrastructure.”74 Another example is East Timor. On October 25, 1999, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 1271, establishing the UN Transitional Administration in
East Timor (UNTAET), with overall legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice.75 The Resolution included provisions to provide security and
maintain law and order; establish an effective administration; assist in the development of
civil and social services; ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
rehabilitation, and development assistance; support capacity building for selfgovernment; and assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.76
The United Nations has created the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC),77 the
Peacebuilding Fund (PBF),78 and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO)79 to address
the needs of peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict. These institutions form a
key addition to the capacity of the international community in terms of a broader peace
agenda. The Peacebuilding Commission brings together all the relevant actors (including
international donors, international financial institutions, national governments, and troop73
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contributing countries); marshals resources; advises on and proposes integrated strategies
for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery; and, where appropriate, highlights gaps that
threaten to undermine peace.80 The mandate of the Commission is comprised of three
objectives: (1) to promote post-conflict peacebuilding through mobilizing relevant actors
both within and outside the UN and to devise strategies and identify the resources
necessary for the promotion of post-conflict reconstruction; (2) to help bridge the gap
between the immediate post-conflict phase and sustainable peace through the
identification of relevant public institutions to support recovery and economic
development; and (3) to provide a monitoring and review function to facilitate
information sharing among all parties concerned.81 The Commission funds projects and
helps in building institutions that promote economic development and good governance.
The PBC has four criteria for funding projects: (a) respond to imminent threats to peace
processes and initiatives that support peace agreements and political dialogue; (b) build
national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict; (c)
stimulate economic revitalization to generate peace dividends; and (d) establish essential
administrative services.82
III. THE MANDATE AND THE PEACEKEEPING MISSION
In any peacekeeping mission the mandate serves as the constitution of the
operation.

A peacekeeping83 mandate informs a peacekeeping operation (PKO).

Although scholars and practitioners use the term “mandate” in different ways, for the
80

S.C. Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005).
Id.
82
Id.
83
Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping in his Agenda for Peace as “the deployment of a UN
presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of the parties, normally involving UN military and/or police
and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the
prevention of conflict and the making of peace.” An Agenda for Peace, supra note 56, at ¶ 20.

81

19

purposes of this article, “mandate” refers to the broad objectives and specific instructions
that define, limit, and guide a peacekeeping operation.

Although it varies by

peacekeeping operation, there is generally not one document that provides the complete
mandate of a peacekeeping operation. Instead, the mandate is found in Security Council
resolutions, the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council, and relevant peace
agreements relating to the mission.

What peacekeepers are authorized, obligated,

inclined, and equipped to do is, in large part, determined by these documents. In fact,
much of what is known by the public about peacekeeping mandates is how little a given
mandate has authorized the peacekeepers to use force and equipped them to protect
civilians. We can all remember how peacekeepers in Rwanda cried desperately for a
more robust peacekeeping mandate that would allow them to use force defensively as
well as offensively to carry out their tasks as outlined in the mandate. Recall the story of
General Derille, the Canadian Force commander in Rwanda, and his famous fax to UN
headquarters.84
One of the weaknesses of the process of developing a mandate is that many of the
actors involved in the creation and development of the mandate are not acquainted with
how other actors involved in the same process operate. This is partly due to the fact that
the process behind the creation of a mandate is often ad hoc, disjointed, and
unpredictable. The key actors are the Security Council members and the donor states that
are responsible for the funding of the mandate. A typical UN mandate contains the
following elements: a background to the situation being addressed, the objective of the
mission, the powers of the mission, the tasks to be implemented, the rules of engagement,
84
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and sometimes the mechanisms to be used to implement the mandate. For example,
Resolution 772, which in 1992 set up the United Nations Observer Mission in South
Africa (UNOMSA), called upon UNOMSA “to strengthen and reinforce the indigenous
mechanisms set up under the National Peace Accords, so as to enhance their capacity in
the building of peace, both in the present and in the future,”85 and Resolution 1769
setting up the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) invokes
Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter to authorize UNAMID’s use of force to protect
civilians.86
Developing a mandate is an inherently political process. Often, Security Council
members receive instructions from their capitals and make rigid proposals with little
flexibility. The process is not inclusive of other member states of the United Nations
who are given no avenues to influence the process.87 Importantly, mandates are both
legal and political in nature. As such, while the language employed by the mandate
drafters can have legal consequences, the rationale behind this language is almost
completely politically driven. The drafting of a mandate involves many actors, ranging
from Security Council members to the warring factions of the host country88 to officers
from the United Nations political and peacekeeping departments. Mandates are a result
of consensus among the parties involved in its development — which parties are not
necessarily directly involved in the conflict. Mandates’ objectives range from assisting in
implementing a comprehensive peace agreement to preventing an outbreak of conflict
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and delivering humanitarian relief supplies, to administering a territory for a transitional
period and conducting elections.89
The mandate of a peacekeeping operation must be distinguished from the legal
basis regulating the implementation of the mandate. The legal framework is founded on
the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that is concluded between the United Nations
and host state.90 Among other things, the SOFA allows the establishment of the mission;
importation of equipment and flying rights; and incorporates the privileges and
immunities of the peacekeepers which define the legal limits that peacekeepers are bound
to when implementing a mandate’s broad objectives and specific instructions.

For

example, while a mandate will include a request for ceasefire verification, the legal
framework will ensure operational needs of the mission and that, unless the United
Nations waves immunity, in the event any peacekeeper commits a crime during such the
duration of the mission, he or she will not be subject to the host state’s legal systems.91
The SOFA sets specific terms for the conduct, privileges, immunities, and jurisdictions of
the military and civilian employees on matters such as criminal and civil jurisdiction.92
SOFAs provide for immunity for peacekeepers from local jurisdictions and establish
exclusive jurisdiction of the troop-contributing peacekeepers’ nation of origin.93 These
are important norms without which peacekeeping missions could not operate effectively.
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Host states could easily frustrate the work of missions by subjecting them to sham
prosecutions and harassment to impede their work.
Immunities for United Nations workers are grounded in articles 104 and 105 of
the UN Charter. These articles provide that the UN and its staff enjoy such privileges
and immunities in territories of member states as are necessary for the independent
exercise of their function.94

They give immunity to the United Nations and its

employees, including peacekeepers, when operating in foreign territory.95 While the
founders of the United Nations did not intend that the privileges and immunities of
officials should constitute a shield from national criminal prosecution for crimes
committed in a state hosting the UN operation where crimes have clearly been
committed, the International Court of Justice has held that personnel employed directly
by the United Nations on mission receive functional immunity from prosecution for acts
committed while executing their duties.96
It bears noting that, while the SOFA guarantees the legality of the peacekeepers’
conduct on the territory of a sovereign country and outlines the conditions under which
the force shall operate in the host state,97 the Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide the
armed forces the authority for the use of force, delineating the circumstances and
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limitations under which the peacekeepers may initiate or continue combat engagement
when encountering other forces.98
The elaboration of a mandate relies on the Secretary-General’s report of the
situation in the host state. Typically, prior to the conclusion of the preparation of the
report the Secretary-General sends a special envoy to the area to get first-hand
information about the situation on the ground. For example, in the case of UNOMSA
following South Africa’s Baipatong massacres on June 17, 1992, the Security Council
unanimously adopted (on July 16, 1992) Resolution 765 by which it, inter alia, invited
the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for South Africa to recommend
— after discussion with the parties in the country — measures which would assist in
bringing an effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations
leading to a peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial, and united South Africa.99
The Secretary-General appointed Cyrus R. Vance as his special representative to South
Africa.

Following Vance’s report, the Secretary-General submitted a report to the

Security Council, which led to the adoption of Resolution 772 on August 17, 1992.
Resolution 772 formed the mandate of UNOMSA.100
Perhaps not surprisingly, the degree of reliance placed on the Secretary-General’s
report by the Security Council will depend on the nature and clarity of the report. That is,
a report that describes the situation on the ground and frames the issues but does not
suggest approaches to addressing these issues will be helpful for the drafting of the
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mandate but will not become the actual mandate. It stands to reason that the most useful
Secretary-General reports are those that clearly identify the issues and suggest solutions.
However, some reports — even those that present issues and solutions — may not
become part of the mandate because the Security Council members’ resources and
interests do not coincide with the requests or suggestions made by the Secretary-General
in the report.
After the adoption of the mandate, the Secretary-General sends one or more
Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) to develop a concept of operations for the
mission, assess the situation on the ground, and determine the local dynamics of the
situation.101 Typically, a small TAM is sent before the mandate is finalized to assess the
financial and technical implications of deploying mission and a more fully-fledged TAM
is sent after the adoption of the mandate.102 TAMs will generally include representatives
from the DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS).103 The representatives of the
DPKO may include, depending on the purpose of the TAM: the Office of Operations, the
Office of Military Affairs, and the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
(including the Police Division, the DDR Section, and the Mine Action Service).104
Increasingly, TAMs include representatives of other UN agencies, such as the UNDP,
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UNICEF, OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR and UNAIDS.105 While in the country, the TAM
meets with all stakeholders, including NGOs.
As was noted previously, many peace agreements form the basis of the
peacekeeping mandate such that either the mandate includes provisions of the peace
agreement or the mandate provides for the implementation of the peace agreement. In
those situations, the United Nations (through the peacekeeping operation) has as its
mandate the implementation of the peace agreement, such as was the case in Liberia,
Sierra Leone, and Afghanistan.106
An issue that often arises in both developing the mandate and in peacekeeping
operations is the extent to which the United Nations can use neighboring countries as
partners in both processes. The use of neighbors has its advantages. As Mark Malan
points out “neighbors are more familiar with each other’s problems than outsiders.
Neighbors usually have a fairly common culture, a common social identity, a common
history and experiences.”107 In the Namibian peace process, neighboring states — the
“frontline states” as they called themselves — played a significant role in facilitating the
agreement that became the basis of the Namibian peace process.108 In 1977, a pressure
group, the Western Contact Group, was formed and included Canada, France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.109 The group launched a joint diplomatic
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effort to bring an internationally acceptable transition to independence for Namibia.110
The Western Contact Group’s efforts led to the presentation in 1978 of Security Council
Resolution 435 for settling the Namibian problem.111 The settlement proposal, as it
became known, was worked out after lengthy consultation with South Africa and the
Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).112
The disadvantage to the involvement of neighboring states is that proximity sometimes
can mean that the “neighbors” are not neutral and, at worst, they can be involved in the
conflict. This was the case in the Congo in the 1990s following the removal of the
Mobutu regime, where a number of neighbors (Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, and
Angola) intervened militarily in the conflict and became part of the problem.113
On many occasions, one of the Security Council permanent members—or another
member state—will take the lead in designing and drafting a particular PKO mandate.114
The sponsoring member state writes the first draft of the mandate, which is subsequently
circulated to the Security Council.115 This tends to happen in cases where the member
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state has a strong interest in ensuring that the PKO successfully solves the conflict. For
example, the United States took the lead in drafting the mandates for both UNMIH
(Haiti) and UNITAF (Somalia), France took the lead in drafting UNOCI’s (Cote
D’Ivoire) mandate, France and the U.S. together took the lead in drafting Lebanon’s
UNIFIL, and the EU and other European states together took the lead in drafting
UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina).116
After the sponsor nation finalizes the drafting of the mandate (in the form of a
Security Council resolution draft), informal consultations begin. There is no official
record of this process. During this meeting, the Security Council reviews the draft as
well as the full Secretary-General report and the peace agreement (if there is one) and
decides what sections to include in the mandate.

Once the Security Council has

extensively reviewed the mandate, formal consultations begin. At this point, the Security
Council member states publicly explain their decision to either support, abstain, or veto
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the Security Council resolution.117 There a is a strong view that the Security Council
should involve troop-contributing countries in the consultation process regarding the
establishment or renewal of the mandate of a peacekeeping operation in a more
meaningful manner and from the outset of the mandate’s elaboration.118

A. Modification of Mandates
Mandates frequently change or are supplemented. A peacekeeping mission may
find that its mandate is deficient at the time of initial deployment or that the mandate does
not address issues that have emerged since deployment. It is always a challenge to assess
— prior to deployment — how the mandate will work and how warring factions, troops,
and civil society will react to the mission. It is thus natural that once the PKO is
deployed in the field, its mandate should be revised to reflect local needs. In fact, the
most successful missions are those that are flexible and easily adaptable to the needs on
the ground.119 This flexibility is particularly important to ensure that the mandate and
mission remain relevant to the conditions prevailing in the conflict state. In South Africa,
for example, Resolution 772 — which did not include an electoral component — was
supplemented by Resolution 894 to respond to the request of the Transitional Executive
Council that the United Nations provide a sufficient number of international observers to
monitor the electoral process and to coordinate the activities of the international
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observers provided by the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth, and the
European Union as well as by governments.120
There are several reasons why PKO mandates change. First, some missions do
not get feedback from the ground until the PKO is deployed — due to, for example, lack
of access to the country because of fighting or hostility from the warring factions. Thus,
it is not until they are in the host country that PKO officials can fully grasp what is
occurring locally. Frequently, changes are simply due to the fact that a specific task
within the mandate is fulfilled and thus replaced by an updated one. As an example, once
disarmament has occurred, a PKO may be required to aid in the reintegration of the excombatants into society. Furthermore, PKOs do not receive all the necessary resources
for full implementation and therefore must constantly change their strategies depending
on how many troops and the level of financial support received. In fact, many PKOs find
that their donors and initial supporters lack the political will initially promised, which in
turn leads to false expectations. Finally, regardless of such shortcomings, conflicts are
characteristically unpredictable, requiring constant adaptation.
As rightly observed in an United Nations report, when changes are made to
existing mandates, commensurate changes should be made to the resources available to
the peacekeeping operation to carry out its new mandate.121 Changes should be based on
a thorough assessment of the situation after full consultation with the Security Council
and troop-contributing states.122 Revisions to a mandate may be implemented by the
Security Council passing a new resolution that formally modifies or adds to the PKO
120
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mandate. For example, the mission initially dispatched to Bosnia-Herzegovina was not
meant to end any war, but rather to deliver humanitarian aid.123

As Kofi Annan

explained, the “nature of the conflict, including ‘ethnic cleansing’ and concentration
camps, seemed to call for something more ambitious.”124 UNPROFOR soon found itself
containing the conflict with measures such as an arms embargo and a no-fly zone to
promote a ceasefire. However, this change, and many other changes in mandates, did not
occur with widespread agreement. In fact, on May 30, 1994, Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali argued for a revision of the UNPROFOR mandate “so that it would
include only those tasks that a peacekeeping operation could be reasonably expected to
perform in the circumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”125
A shift that has occurred on several occasions with peacekeeping operations is moving
from a Chapter VI to a Chapter VII mandate.126 This occurred in the UN Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 1999-2005) and in the UN Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC, 2000-present) due to a deteriorating
security situation on the ground.127 The new mandates authorize the PKO to take “the
necessary action” to ensure freedom of movement and protection of civilians.128 Other
shifts require the creation of an entirely new peacekeeping operation the necessary
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change is so drastic that modifying an already existing mandate may not be enough. This
occurred in Somalia between 1992-95 in the transition from UNOSOM I to UNITAF to
UNOSOM II. Somalia experienced a mixture of peacekeeping, peace making, peace
enforcement, and nation-building.129 UNOSOM I began as a mission to support
humanitarian relief, but was soon overwhelmed by the Somali warlords.130 Even with a
Chapter VII mandate, the PKO lacked the force of arms and thus had to transition into a
full-fledged military operation that did not resolve the Somali crisis.131 The United
Nations does not presently have a peacekeeping mission in Somalia. It has authorized an
African Union Mission (AMISOM).132 Unfortunately, the Somalia crisis continues as a
Humans Right Watch report observes: “Somalia is nation in ruins, mired in one of the
world’s most brutal armed conflicts of recent years.”133 IV. CONDITIONS AND
FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE SUCCESS
OF A PEACEKEEPING MISSION
This section identifies critical factors that impact on the success of a mission.
Most of the conflicts are characterized by the combination of internal and international
factors in the conflict with serious human rights violations and large scale suffering
among the threatened civilian population, which inevitably results in large numbers of
refugees and displaced persons. Very often, conflict is a symptom of an intrastate crisis
that is deeply rooted in the following conditions: authoritarian rule; exclusion of
minorities from governance; socio-economic deprivation; and weak state structures that
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lack the capacity to handle normal political and social conflict.134

Against this

background — and cognizant that generalizations can be dangerous — a number of
factors seem to determine the success of an intervention: cooperation of the parties
implementing the mandate; continuing support of the Security Council; readiness of the
states to provide financial, technical, and materials resources to the mission; the need to
deal with both past and current human rights violations; the need to deal with gender
issues; and leadership of the mission. Each of these issues warrants discussion.
A good mandate should be clear and practical and be backed by secure funding.
In order to structure a clear mandate there must be a clear understanding of the nature of
the problem and the underlying cause.

The strategic implication of this is that in

structuring mandates and UN missions, we must focus on the structural causes of conflict
in order to build a solid foundation for peace and ensure a future free of conflicts. For
example, in the case of Liberia, poverty, authoritarian rule, and the old conflict between
Americo-Liberians and indigenous Liberians documented by J. Gus Liebenow in his
1969 book Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege, has contributed significantly to the crises
Liberia has experienced.135 In Afghanistan, poverty, authoritarian rule by the warlords
and the Taliban, and denial of basic human rights are major factors that contributed to the
ignition of the crisis situation that continues today. In present-day Darfur, religious
tensions and the attempt by the Arab population to ethnically cleanse the North of the
black Sudanese population are significant factors in the conflict. Such crisis situations
underscore that political stability requires structural accommodation of diversity. In other
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words, for the purpose of devising UN mandates and missions, it is necessary to
distinguish between the symptoms and causes of intrastate crises. Peacekeeping efforts
which treat the symptoms rather than sources of conflict lack a built-in exit strategy and
often lead to failure. The Somali crisis is often given as an example of this phenomenon.
Unfortunately, the resources and energies of the international community tend to
be mobilized around the symptoms — rather than the causes — of conflicts. As a result,
traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for several decades, such as in Cyprus
and the India/Pakistan border. It must also be taken into account that peacekeeping
increasingly involves internal wars with armed elements only partially under the control
of those who consent to a United Nations deployment. In these cases, it might be
necessary to first stabilize the situation before a peacekeeping operation can be deployed,
as was the case in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In some contemporary post-conflict

situations, peacekeeping forces may need the ability to use force, if necessary, to keep the
initiative of the peace process on track and to defend the peacekeeping mission and its
mandate. A clear mandate must address the need to use force in such circumstances. The
Eastern Congo is an example of a situation where the use of force was necessary to
confront the militias terrorizing the civilian population.
The mandate must be guided by the understanding that peace making and
peacebuilding are primarily the responsibility of local rather than foreign actors.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, the UN peacekeeping operations may be more
effective when the UN is not intricately involved in the peace negotiations at the outset of
the talks. In Cambodia in the 1990s, the contours of the mission were sketched out at an
array of informal meetings that allowed all the relevant regional actors to make their
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preferences known.136 As a result, even though the interests of Vietnam and China were
diametrically opposed throughout the negotiations process, the UN mandate was able to
avoid association with the dispute and to assume some semblance of impartiality.
Similarly, in the South African peace process, local stakeholders negotiated a settlement
and the UN helped implement it through monitoring the peace accord structures and
supporting the elections process in 1994.137 Such successful examples highlight that the
peace process must seek ways of involving the local people in all aspects of its operations
to the fullest extent. It must also seek to involve regional actors.
Involvement of regional actors is important and holds relatively untapped
potential for the UN. The current missions in Sudan and Somalia are examples of a
growing collaboration between the UN and the Africa Union. Regional actors can help
players reach solutions compatible with local traditions and can act as guarantors to the
peace process. Clearly, such interactions will require a greater amount of trust on the
parts of both the United Nations and regional actors. Regional actors are sometimes
skeptical of the United Nations’ intentions. On the other hand, the United Nations has
experienced difficulties in relation to capacities on the part of regional actors, and even
regional organizations face problems of capacity.138 The AU Mission in Darfur which
preceded the current UN/AU mission, for example, was financed almost entirely by the
136
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European Union and the United Nations.139 Until western states came to the AU’s aid,
the AU faced considerable difficulties in meeting the needs of the mission in Sudan as
African armies lacked essential equipment such as helicopters and logistics equipment.
Nonetheless, a key advantage to involving regional actors is that neighbors are
more familiar than outsiders are with each other’s problems. The disadvantage is that
close proximity reduces impartiality and heightens the risk of involvement.140 There is
also the problem of differences over applicable values. A recent example is the sharp
differences in the views held by the United Nations and the African Union over the
indictment of Bashir by the International Criminal Court. To maximize the benefits,
cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations must be based on
strict observance of the principles and ideals of the United Nations Charter.
In developing a mandate, as a political body, the Security Council focuses on
consensus building, even though it can make decisions with less than unanimity. But
very often, the compromise required to build consensus can be made at the expense of
specificity, and the resulting ambiguity can have serious consequences in the field if the
mandate is then subject to varying interpretations.

The worst example of the

consequences of an inadequate mandate is the Rwanda Genocide. There was a lack of
clarity as to whether peacekeeping or peace enforcement was needed. There is general
agreement that had action been taken in Rwanda, the genocide could very well have been
averted. Because an inadequate mandate could lead to the UN itself exacerbating a
problem, it is crucial that peacekeeping missions are given robust mandates.
139
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It is important to emphasize that, in circumstances where a party to a peace
agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of
all parties by the UN can, in the best case, result in ineffectiveness — and in the worst
may amount to complicity with evil. The UN is not a neutral actor and should not be; it
is an organization guided by the core values of the United Nations Charter. Impartiality
does not mean neutrality. Neutrality in the face of violations of the UN Charter norms
only rewards the transgressors.

No failure did more to damage the standing and

credibility of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish victim from
aggressor in such missions as the Congo in the 1960s.
At a practical level, once deployed, UN peacekeepers must be able to carry out
their mandates professionally and successfully. This means that UN military units must
be capable of defending themselves, other mission components, and the mission’s
mandate.

Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force UN

contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers. United Nations peacekeepers have
often come under attack for failing to protect civilians.141 In the Sudan, for example,
there are complaints that UNAMID is failing to protect civilians.142 The problem appears
to be that UN forces often seek Sudanese authorization to move around the country and
do not move unless they are given clearance by the host government. Further, the United
Nations takes the view that the primary responsibility to protect civilians lies with the
countries concerned.143 This is an unrealistic approach that cannot advance the objectives
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of the mandate and protect civilians. Once the United Nations has a mandate and Status
of Forces Agreement, the two documents should be the only guiding documents.
Peacekeeping missions cannot succeed unless the warring parties agree to
cooperate in the implementation of the mandate. Force alone cannot create peace; it can
only create the space in which peace maybe established. As a result, consent of the
parties is the bedrock principle of peacekeeping operations. The problem is that local
parties sometimes sign peace accords for a variety of reasons — not all of them favorable
to peace — there often “spoiler-groups” who renege on their commitments or otherwise
seek to undermine a peace accord through violence. In both Sierra Leone and Angola,
the first peacekeeping operations did not produce lasting peace; in each country,
challenged peace implementation threw the nation back into civil war.144
For peacekeeping to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the UN
needs clear, unwavering, strong, and sustained political support from the Security
Council and member states.145 Lack of support can result in delays or impediments to
taking action, as well as a lack of sufficient resources to effectively implement a course
of action once it has been decided upon.
A. Readiness of member states to contribute troops, personnel, and adequate financial
and logistical support
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The United Nations is totally dependent on the contributions of member states for
peacekeeping missions; the UN does not have a standing army or police force.146 As is
well known, the UN continues to experience a troop commitment gap. Industrial states
tend to prioritize deployment of their troops to operations led by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization states (NATO), the European Union and/or ad hoc coalitions
authorized by the Security Council.

Developing countries continued to provide the

largest numbers of military and civilian police personnel for United Nations
peacekeeping operations.147

The commitment gap often translates into delays in

deployment. Examples of the effect of delays is in Liberia, where the UN force was
authorized in August 2003, but by March 2004 it still had not achieved its full strength,
delaying key programs such as the disarmament of combatants.148
The speedy deployment of military, civil police, and civilian experts will not help
to solidify peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not
equipped to do their job.

To be effective, the mission’s personnel need material,

equipment, and logistical support. The early days of the Sierra Leone mission provides a
very clear example of what could happen when men and women are deployed without
logistical support: lacking communications equipment and weapons to defend
themselves, 500 United Nations peacekeepers were captured by rebel fighters in the early
days of the Sierra Leone mission.149 Willingness by member states to contribute troops
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to a credible operation also implies a willingness to accept the risk of casualties on behalf
of the mandate; nevertheless, it is hard for countries to accept this reality.
The missions in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and East Timor can be
considered successful missions in terms of supporting multiparty elections that resulted in
the formation of broad-based representative governments.

Although these missions

operated in completely dissimilar environments, they are a useful indicator of the
conditions for success. As previously discussed, these conditions can be roughly divided
into two categories: the nature of the mandates and the resources available to each
mission.
In terms of respective mandates, in Cambodia, Namibia, and Mozambique, the
warring parties had concluded a peace agreement and welcomed UN involvement and
deployment of a peacekeeping force. Although it may seem obvious that a mission is
more likely to succeed when opponents have already agreed upon a solution, it is
important to note that this was not easily achieved at the outset in any of the three cases
and was the result of intensive negotiations. In Cambodia, Vietnam and the Khmer
Rouge each remained determined to vanquish the other while their foreign suppliers were
content to watch their proxies fight. In Namibia, despite General Assembly and Security
Council Resolutions, South Africa remained convinced for many years that a military
victory over the guerrilla forces was possible.150 In Mozambique, a brutal war ranged for
several years between FRELIMO and RENAMO as their backers were remained
prepared to fund the conflict. In each of these cases, serious negotiations began only
after it became obvious to all parties involved in the conflict that a military stalemate had
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resulted,151 thus lending serious weight to the idea that a critical element for successful
peacekeeping is the realization that outright victory for either side is unlikely, and a
sound peace agreement which has the support of all the parties to the conflict is the best
case scenario.
An additional “success” factor in Cambodia, Namibia, and Mozambique was that
the mandates of each mission and the respective peace settlement was negotiated
primarily by outsiders, lending further credence to the view that UN peacekeeping
operations are more likely to be effective when the UN is not intricately involved in the
minute details of negotiations at the outset. In Mozambique, the Vatican mediated the
peace negotiations between FRELIMO and RANAMO, which led to a ceasefire and a
peace agreement that the UN went in to implement.152 And, as already pointed out in the
Cambodia case, the contours of the mission were sketched out at an array of informal
meetings that allowed all of the relevant regional actors to make their preferences
known.153 Likewise, in Namibia, the regional actors, through a group called the Front
Line States, negotiated some of the terms of the peace settlement.154 These cases would
suggest that regional blocks in some situations may be better incubators of UN mandates
than the Security Council.
B. Human Rights Violence — Current and Past
Conflict situations are characterized by lack of respect for the rule of law, gross
human rights violations, and impunity. In a post-conflict society, some of the most
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difficult tasks include articulating a vision of a new society, dealing with past human
rights violations, defining the fundamental principles by which the country will be
transformed, and engaging in effective reconciliation.

The manner in which these

processes are handled can play an important role in the consolidation of peace. A
peacekeeping mission must have a component within the peace process to develop
mechanisms to address the development of a comprehensive program for national
reconciliation. Examples are the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions that have been
established in various countries emerging from gross human rights violations.155
Indeed, there can be no lasting peace where a nation does not deal with its past
and its citizens continue to be traumatized. Each mission should have a humanitarian
component to deal with the often tragic conditions that people in zones of conflict
inhabit. Many thousands of people are often driven from their homes in conflict zones.
In fact, it is estimated that there are now over 25 million internally displaced people
worldwide — outnumbering refugees by more than two to one.156

A humanitarian

component will ensure a more coherent and strategically coordinated humanitarian
response to the plight of internally displaced people. Particular attention should be given
to addressing the needs of children.
C. Gender Component
Similarly, a good peacekeeping mission should have a gender unit to ensure that
gender equality in the mission, as well as the peace process, is mainstreamed. Women
have their own perspective and experiences to bring to conflict resolution, particularly in
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light of the fact that women are disproportionately impacted by conflict.157 After all,
what can be more democratic than to ensure that every voice is heard in the political
process? One way of ensuring that gender is a critical part of the mission is to start with
the mission itself. There should be increased participation of women at all levels of the
mission. As has been observed — including through Security Council Resolution 1325
— mainstreaming gender into peacebuilding initiatives is critical to making societies
more equitable and just.158 The inclusion of women in peacebuilding activities could
help unshackle societies from patriarchy and promote a transformative agenda. Such
action must also facilitate the addressing of unequal power relations and gender
inequality.159 The very first all-female peacekeeping force was deployed in Liberia in
2007.160 Since then, scores of women have helped to disengage armed forces, protect
civilians, and promote human rights. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has
spoken about the positive impact women bring to peacekeeping, stating that “whether
interviewing victims of sexual violence, working in women’s prisons, assisting female
ex-combatants reintegrating into civilian life, or mentoring female police cadets, women
personnel have a clear advantage. They can help empower women to rebuild their wartorn countries and act as role models.”161 Further, it has been noted that the presence of
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women peacekeepers in Liberia is reducing the incidence of sexual exploitation.162 For
all of these reasons, a serious and robust gender component should be prioritized as a
central component to each peacekeeping mission — and should not be relegated to an
after-thought or “soft issue.”
D. Leadership of Mission
Effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive
mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances and one that
struggles to maintain those attributes. The tenor of an entire mission can be heavily
influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it. The heads of United Nations
peacekeeping missions are unique in their ex officio ability to make or break a peace
operation and because they may significantly enhance an operation’s credibility and
effectiveness through measured judgment strength of character and on the ground
acuity.163 It is widely acknowledged that the success of the Mozambique mission was
due to the excellent leadership provided by the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral Aldo Ajello.164 It is important, therefore, that careful attention be given to
choosing heads of peacekeeping missions; proven leadership, judgment, and integrity are
among the core attributes that must be sought and demonstrated.
V. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES IN A PEACEKEEPING MISSION
In addition to the challenges discussed above, peacekeeping missions encounter
issues relating to security and disarmament of combatants and their reintegration into
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society. Peacebuilding makes a direct contribution to public security and law and order.
But the basic objective of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is not met
unless all three elements of the process are implemented. These are always part of the
major tasks that peacekeeping missions need to address.

As might be reasonably

expected from the broad variety and scope of peacekeeping missions, the results over
these issues have been mixed. A number of conditions are necessary for a successful
reconstruction, disarmament, and reintegration program.

Reconstruction is a critical

objective for the long-term success of a mission. David Keen makes the important point
that when we talk about reconstruction it should be clear that it is not about
reconstructing the exact social and economic conditions prevailing at the outset of a
conflict that caused the problem in the first place.165 Failure to tackle the underlying
grievance will be damaging in the long run. Byron Tarr illustrates this point when he
makes the argument that Liberia’s past efforts at reform are replete with failure because
they all fail to address the underlying problems of marginalization of indigenous people,
decentralization, and Liberia’s inability to decide whether it remains “an outpost of
Western civilization” or is an African state desiring to be a responsible member of an
integrating subregion.166
Disarmament and demobilization of former combatants are key to immediate
post-conflict stability and reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Indeed,

disarmament is the smallest part of the peace process while reintegration is often a bigger
problem. Whether economic and political reconstruction can begin depends on how
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quickly security spreads throughout the country. Typically, the main spoilers are the
politicians; the fighters are more committed to peace than their political masters.
Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of
violence if they find no legitimate livelihood — that is, if they are not “reintegrated” into
the local economy.

In the end, economic development is critical to sustained

demobilization and the peace process. Reintegration is a long-term matter that must be
linked to jump starting the country’s economy and giving fighters hope of better
prospects. Money will be needed to assist in providing training, skills, and vocational
education. Jobs are an essential ingredient of an effective reintegration strategy that will
be critical for breaking the ties of fighters to their political masters. The typical approach
is to train ex-fighters in various trades such as bricklaying and carpentry. Without job
opportunities to utilize the trades taught, the training does not provide real alternatives.
An example of what can happen when there is no meaningful reintegration is East Timor
in 2006, where ex-combatants rebelled and started fighting with the army.167 Patterns of
development that empower ordinary people through jobs and access to education and
improved security will weaken the position of warlords and extremist politicians who
offer to meet these needs through violence and harassment of the people.
A separate challenge that should be considered in peacekeeping missions is that
there is often too much focus on early elections in peace processes. Elections are an
important and necessary component of the democratic process, and most peace
agreements call for elections early on in the process. However, to conduct an election is
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a logistically huge undertaking.

It requires security and capacity.

Warlords have

demonstrated time and time again that they benefit most from a premature rush to the
ballot box and from the sham legitimacy that it confers. It must be borne in mind that an
election is a contest — and a contest is necessarily combative. Elections therefore
require clear rules so that even the losers trust that the rules have been applied justly;
otherwise, former enemies will continue their rivalry and contest by other means. In
cases where elections are premature and poorly organized, the heightened expectations
surrounding the elections can become a dangerous force. In such situations, elections do
not guarantee democracy; they, in fact, can make matters worse. In this regard, one need
only look at the Liberian elections in the 1990s that brought Charles Taylor to power and
legitimized his rule.168
An additional problem is too much focus on leaders rather than ordinary people.
UN peace processes are often built around leaders and do not pay sufficient attention to
the ordinary people. Typically, there is no parallel peace process on the ground. The
exception was South Africa, where Peace Accord Structures were established through
legislation at national, regional, and local levels.169

The Structures, comprised of

inclusive committees representing stakeholders at local community, district, and
provincial levels, established and discussed the peace process and reconstruction of
infrastructure damaged in political violence in the various communities. These forums
played a critical role in articulating the concerns of ordinary people and fed into the

168

In Liberia after the 1989 elections that brought Charles Taylor to power the security situation
deteriorated. Conflicts escalated and thousands of civilians were killed. See United Nations Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL) Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml.
169
Final Rep. of the U.N. Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA) to the U.N. Secretary-General
(May 26, 1994).

47

national process.170

The local Structures enable communities to contribute to the

maintenance of a secure local environment for peacebuilding and enable the
peacebuilder’s task of supporting the political, social, and economic changes that create a
secure, self-sustaining environment.

After all, the goal of international intervention

should always be seen first and foremost as facilitating local processes, providing
resources, and creating the local actors to resolve their own problems.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has offered some suggestions on how peacekeeping missions can be
made more effective. The success of a mission will depend largely on whether there is a
clear and responsive peacekeeping mandate and whether the mandate is supported by
adequate resources and effective leadership. Mandates are texts that are open to a certain
degree of interpretation. In that respect, peacekeeping missions must be prepared to
adapt mandates to local conditions and missions must show flexibility. At the same time,
mandates must be interpreted in a more expansive manner. Since it is usually up to the
Force Commander and the Secretary-General’s Special Representative to direct the
implementation of the mandate, they may do so by going beyond the initial narrowly
defined objective of the mandate when the circumstances demand such departure. They
should be informed by conditions on the ground. In that respect, the peacekeepers must
view the mandate as a floor rather than a ceiling. This can be a helpful start for the
adaptation of the mandate to the needs of the conditions on the ground and more effective
peacekeeping.
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Among the lessons we have learned over time — including from the Liberian
situation in 1990, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 2006 — is that the world must not pull
out from post conflict states too early. Consolidating peace and putting a country on the
path to development requires sustained multi-year support.

It requires promoting

development agendas that seek to transform the society and conditions that played
midwife to the conflict. Development agendas should put education, employment, and
participation in governance at the heart of conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction. The temptation among donors to favor immediate results and short time
planning horizons in dictating their commitments, do not lend themselves to the kind of
slow and sustained support required for post-conflict peacebuilding. The international
community has to remain engaged long after the peace process is solved — otherwise,
history repeats itself.

Special attention must be paid to developing institutions of

governance and public administration, a process which is, of course, complex. First
governance is a concept that is wider than, but includes, public administration. Taking
this into account, there is a need to guard against considering only institutions of
government; the discussion must include institutions that facilitate collaboration,
involvement, consultation, and participation of all stakeholders in all sectors (public
sector, private sector, and civil society) in the act of governance. The United Nations has
recognized this and important steps have been taken within the UN to establish structures
to address some of these issues. For example, this article mentioned the Peacebuilding
Commission initiative, and there are others such as the establishment of a mediation
support unit followed by a team of mediators to provide technical expertise and support
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for high-level UN and regional mediators. In addition, the UN has established regional
offices in West Africa and Central Asia to support UN peace initiatives.
Peacekeeping initiatives offer unique and extraordinary promise in bringing about
and consolidating peace in the most dire of circumstances. Given the enormity of the
stakes, it behooves the international community to assess past peacekeeping experiences
and draw from lessons learned. Only with serious investment, planning, inclusion, and
leadership can the promise of peacekeeping be realized — and it is an objective well
worth striving to reach.
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